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The Curious Case of the Nuclear Company of Britain and Iran
Ali M. Ansari
School of History, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
ABSTRACT
In February 1977, on a routine visit to Tehran, Sir Walter Marshall, the chief scientist at the
department of Energy and deputy chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, was made a
seemingly impromptu “radical proposal” by the then head of the Atomic Energy Organisation, Dr
Akbar Etemad for a strategic collaboration between the emergent nuclear industry of Iran and
that of the UK which faced an uncertain future. Etemad’s proposal envisioned Iranian capital
combining with British expertise in the form of a joint company that would be the salvation of
both and mark a definitive new era in British–Iranian relations. Eighteen months of tough
negotiations ended, failing to yield the desired commitment. But the encounter, largely ignored
by historians sheds important new light on the politics of development in both Iran and the UK,
along with the complexities of policy-making, and not least, the subtleties of the British–Iranian





Walter Marshall; the Shah
A radical proposal
In early February 1977, Sir Walter Marshall, chief scien-
tist at the department of Energy and deputy chairman
of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, arrived in Tehran
for what was assumed to be a routine meeting with the
President of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
(AEOI), Dr Akbar Etemad. Britain had been a key
player in the supply of services and training to the
emerging Iranian nuclear programme and the visit
had been arranged to discuss matters of mutual interest
including progress on current contracts and a general
review of Iran’s strategy in light of more recent US
anxieties about nuclear proliferation. Etemad began
the meeting by reviewing Iran’s programme and reas-
suring his British interlocutors that while Iran was
keen on ensuring technology transfer sufficient to
enable Iran to reach its ambitious targets, Iran was
not seeking “to build enrichment or reprocessing plants
… in the short to medium term”.
There then followed a discussion about the possibility
of building a training reactor in Isfahan – to which Mar-
shall noted he now had the authorisation from the Sec-
retary of State to proceed – before, after some
deliberation about the state of the British nuclear indus-
try, Etemad turned to Marshall and, “said that he would
like to make a radical proposal… on a personal basis”.
As he saw it, the UK were [sic] on the brink of a series of
crucial and linked decisions, on thermal reactor type, on
the role for NPC, on the future of the boiler making
industry and on the future of the turbine industry. Fur-
thermore because of competition from North Sea oil and
gas this entire industry was to be heavily export orien-
tated. Simultaneously Iran had become dissatisfied
with its lack of participation in the German and French
nuclear industries despite the large contracts Iran had
placed with them. Therefore, provided the UK chose
the PWR for its own programme, would we consider
favourably the idea of Iranian investment in the UK
industry so as to equip it properly to supply PWRs for
both the UK and Iran markets?1
It would be fair to say that the proposal took the
British delegation by surprise. It envisaged the establish-
ment of a joint nuclear company, combining Iranian
capital with British technical expertise, to energise and
oversee the development of the nuclear industries in
both Britain and Iran. Indeed, the idea was quite revo-
lutionary in its conception and ambition. In effect, it
sought to bind the British and Iranian economies in a
strategic alliance that would see massive Iranian capital
investment in Britain’s declining industrial base, in
return for the eventual transfer of key technologies. Ete-
mad had effectively thrown the British nuclear industry
a lifeline in a fully collaborative venture that would
enhance, by stages, the industrial and technical base
of both countries. Unsurprisingly, for all the enthusiasm
of Marshall and his colleagues, the broader political and
diplomatic establishment remained sceptical. For some
months thereafter, British officials debated the merits
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of the offer and whether it was genuine, or as the British
Ambassador Antony Parsons noted as late as July 1977,
whether Britain was being used “Judas goats to bring on
other potential, but reluctant partners”.2 Parsons, along
with other key players, eventually concluded that the
offer was too good to pass up and that it deserved
serious attention resulting in extended discussions
towards the formation of a detailed, Outline Plan, for
the formation of the company.
That matters never ultimately proceeded had as much
to do with economic decisions in Britain as it did with
anxieties over long-term political stability in Iran or
indeed concerns over proliferation. Indeed, the initial
enthusiasm with which British and Iranian officials
approached the prospective arrangement belies the pop-
ular perception of a political relationship hampered by
persistent and deleterious suspicions. On the contrary,
quite apart from the structural reasons for collaboration,
the evidence suggests a relationship bound by personal
mutual respect. Indeed, the secrecy that pervaded the
talks had as much to do with precluding the damaging
intervention of competitors as with anxieties over dom-
estic repercussions.3 But this episode also sheds impor-
tant light on industrial and political policy, as well as
the nature of policy-making, in both Britain and Iran,
during a decade in which nuclear energy was still
regarded as the solution to mankind’s expanding energy
requirements. This was in effect the high water mark of
the nuclear industry and Iran had the means and the
determination to join this exclusive club: not simply
for the economic benefits it might bestow but perhaps
as its shrewd officials recognised, for the political boun-
ties it might confer.
Preamble
Iran’s interest in nuclear energy can be traced back to Pre-
sident Eisenhower’s “Atom’s for Peace” policy in 1957.
Little substantive progress was made beyond this and
the modest research reactor established in the
University of Tehran was shut down in 1969 due to a
“lack of technically qualified operating staff and the
absence of a planned research programme”.4 Indeed, by
the end of that decade, Iran’s modest foray into nuclear
physics had effectively stuttered to a halt. Perhaps the
most significant development for the future was its early
adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1970, to which it was one of the first signatories.
As Iran entered the 1970s, there was little indication of
any further developments though as an intriguing
encounter in 1972 indicated, the Shah – now comfortably
settled on his throne – remained interested. On a state
visit to the UK in 1972, the Shah had a discrete meeting
with Lord Victor Rothschild, then head of PrimeMinister
Edward Heath’s Central Policy Review Unit. Rothschild,
raised the question of nuclear power with the Shah. He
said he was interested in keeping technologically abreast
of the United States and Great Britain. I explained to
him there was the possibility of his being ahead of
these two countries in the Breeder Reactor Field.5
It should come as no surprise that the Shah was inter-
ested but it would be another couple of years before there
was any substantive movement and despite the initial
profession of interest, Britain enjoyed more of a support-
ing role as the plans for the Atomic Energy Organisation
of Iran began to take shape. The turning point came in
1974. At the end of the previous year, the Shah had
announced the quadrupling of oil prices at a press con-
ference in Niavaran Palace – an oil price shock that
came fast on the heels of an earlier hike in prices follow-
ing the Yom Kippur War.6 Iran’s economy was suddenly
flush with money on a scale few could have imagined.
Almost overnight, the Shah was transformed in the pub-
lic imagination from the “enlightened” autocrat of a
sympathetic third world power, to the “Emperor of
Oil”. Threats and opportunities abounded but above all
the Shah and his thoroughly “modern” Iran had to be
acknowledged and respected rather than tolerated and
accommodated. Indeed, Iran’s newfound status and the
responsibilities it now aspired to demanded a whole
new vision for the future which could not only be ima-
gined but through the bounties of oil money, realised.
There was a keen sense that for all past difficulties, this
was Iran’s moment, and it had to be seized. No one
had a more acute sense of urgency than the Shah himself.
The experience of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 had
convinced the Shah that Western security guarantees
were rarely cast iron: a sense of vulnerability that was
only enhanced by India’s detonation of a nuclear device
in May 1974. For the West, the opportunities afforded by
Iran’s nuclear ambitions were likewise qualified by
anxieties over proliferation now heightened by develop-
ments in India (India had developed the technology from
civil nuclear components delivered by Canada), resulting
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in the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group – The
Club of London – in 1975.7
Meanwhile in March 1974, the AEOI was established
under the presidency of Dr Akbar Etemad,8 the then
chancellor of Bu Ali Sina University in Hamedan, a
new university which he had been instrumental in
founding, and which by all accounts he was quite reluc-
tant to leave. However, the Shah was quite determined to
have him in post and after some reflection, he decided to
take on the challenge on the basis that he would have at
least one month to conduct a feasibility study of what
needed to be done and more importantly, that he
would answer directly to the Shah. With these points
agreed, Etemad proceeded to sit with the Shah’s chief
of staff, Nosratollah Moinian, and draft the farman for
the Shah’s signature.9 The challenge was vast not least
because of the Shah’s ambitious targets and the absence
of any serious infrastructure in terms of personnel and
material.10 The Shah had set a target of 24,000 MW of
electrical energy to be supplied by up to 20 nuclear
power plants by 1994, when it was imagined Iran’s oil
resources would be in serious decline.11 Iran’s total
energy requirements by 1994 had been estimated at
70,000 MW with the balance being provided by, gas,
hydroelectric and even solar power, but perhaps what
is most remarkable about these figures was the fact
that Etemad himself was never quite clear how they
had been reached and why for example, a third had
been allocated to nuclear generation.12 These targets
appeared quite arbitrary and according the Etemad
were regarded as more aspirational than practical.13 Ete-
mad has subsequently speculated that they may have
resulted from a public imperial pronouncement that
could not be subsequently withdrawn.14
In other respects, however, there appeared to be con-
siderable synergy and agreement between Etemad and
the Shah as to the direction and nature of nuclear policy.
Moreover, contrary to the popular view, ideas and strat-
egy regularly originated with Etemad to be later con-
firmed by the Shah and the President of the AEOI was
not afraid to contradict his master, who, according to
Etemad, was not averse to being challenged, if he felt a
good case could be made. Indeed, Etemad’s relationship
with the Shah reflected his own approach and policy
towards the talent that he drew to the AEOI, most
obviously Ahmad Sotoudeh Nia (Project Manager for
Nuclear Power Plants), whom Etemad later singled out
for particular praise.15 Indeed, the impression that is reg-
ularly presented, of a highly centralised political and
managerial structure in late Pahlavi Iran – a view it
must be said that was held by the British – is not reflected
in Etemad’s account of his operations. For Etemad, the
failures of Pahlavi government were as much the respon-
sibility of ill-conceived deference, as it was the Shah’s
apparent proclivity to centralise power in his own hands.
Be that as it may, there was little disagreement on the
value of the nuclear industry for Iran, which both viewed
as political as much as economic. The nuclear industry
was a strategic asset in every sense of the term and this
important distinction in the Iranian approach is crucial
for understanding why they finally turned to Britain.
That Iran had energy needs for expanding industrial
and domestic consumption was not in question. The
Shah was above all concerned that Iran would run out
of sufficient oil reserves by the mid-1990s and that she
would require adequate alternative sources of energy to
maintain industrial momentum. Energy self-sufficiency
was the ambition of many countries in this period and
Iran was no exception in regarding nuclear energy as
the route. Given the timeframe for the construction of
reactors, it was vital that Iran began planning now and
by fortunate happenstance, she had the money to do it.
But simply energy self-sufficiency was not enough and
Etemad in particular was adamant that Iran acquired
an industry that had mastered the technical aspects of
the trade. Iran had to be technically self-sufficient as
well as energy self-sufficient and it had to find a partner
that would develop with it. The industry had to have
strategic depth so that it would not, as with the oil indus-
try, remain indebted to Western technical expertise.16
But beyond this, there was an appreciation that the
broader economic benefits of the industry ran parallel
to a number of long-term political objectives, not least
the ability to provide energy stability for a country that
had been subject to the volatility of oil prices and the pol-
itical consequences that followed. But in tandem with
these benefits was the belief that Iran’s standing in the
international community had been enhanced by its role
7On the impact of India’s detonation, see Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History.”
8AB 48/1286, “Visit to Iran from 13th to 19th December 1975.”
9Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 86.
10Ibid., 87.
11AB 48/1286, “Nuclear collaboration with Iran.”
12Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 89.
13Ibid., 90.
14Akbar Etemad, Interview with Author, London, 25 August 2014.
15Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 133–4.
16Ibid., 94. Etemad makes it clear that while Iran may yet be dependent on supplies of uranium (despite two mines subsequently being discovered in Iran, the
quality of the uranium matters), the point was technical mastery. See also Hamblin, p. 25.
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as an oil power and that this favourable situation would
only last as long as oil existed. Consequently, it was felt
that with oil expected to decline rapidly from the
1990s, Iran would need something else to continue exer-
cising the leverage – and respect – it currently enjoyed.
But if both men appreciated the political dimensions of
the nuclear industry, they differed in one significant
respect; and that was with respect to the long-term pol-
itical stability of the country. Indeed, the paradox in this
pursuit of energy and hence political security was that
the Shah’s acute anxieties about future stability encour-
aged him to set targets that Etemad among others, felt
were unnecessary, unreasonable and in fact counter-pro-
ductive to both industrial and political stability.17
The importance of this different approach for nuclear
strategy was this: in order to achieve the sort of nuclear
energy within the 20-year time frame envisaged by the
Shah, a major part of the strategy would by necessity
involve “turnkey” contracts, by which Iran would pur-
chase reactors, in their entirety from suppliers with little
input into components, or indeed in the management of
the reactors, which would be serviced by personnel pro-
vided by the supplier. This was undoubtedly the quicker
route, but, for Etemad and his colleagues, it was strategi-
cally shortsighted insofar as it would not assist in the
development of an indigenous (civil) capability. Far bet-
ter to enter into an agreement with a partner willing to
collaborate and share technology than to move quicker
but have no access to the scientific base.
Be that as it may, within months of the establishment
of the AEOI, and soon after the Indian detonation, the
Shah had visited Paris and signed an agreement for tech-
nological cooperation with France which entailed the
French supply of five nuclear power plants generating
some 5000 MW of electricity by the 1980s. In November
of the same year, a letter of intent was signed with Fra-
matome for the construction of two plants (900 MW
each) to come on stream in 1982 and 1983, respectively,
while a further agreement was signed with the German
firm, Kraftwerk Union (KWU) for “the supply of a
further two nuclear reactors (total 1200 MW) to come
on stream in 1980 and 1981”.18 There had been some
delay in starting the construction due to the inability to
find suitable sites, but there was little doubt that Iran
had hit the floor running and the trade press was particu-
larly impressed with the Iranian government’s decision
to take a 10% stake in the Eurodif enrichment plant
then being built in southern France.
In January 1975 Iran agreed to provide a $1000 m loan
to France to alleviate financial problems, and as a part of
the deal it won a large stake in France’s two massive
uranium enrichment plant projects… This was a
smart move to secure safe supplies of enriched uranium
fuel.19
At this stage, it appeared that the French were willing to
collaborate on technical fronts despite the apparent oppo-
sition of the United States and the increasing anxiety
which had resulted from developments in India. Yet,
despite some US discomfort, it was clear that they too
were seeking a share of this emerging market.
The only players not being actively considered were
the British. This was in large part due to the state of
the nuclear industry in Britain and the decision to pursue
Steam Generated HeavyWater Reactors (SGHWR) tech-
nology that the Iranians were not particularly interested
in pursuing themselves having expressed a desire to
develop Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs).20 Lord
Aldington, Chairman of the National Nuclear Corpor-
ation had visited Iran in December 1974 and had
informed the Shah that Britain would not be able to
supply SGHWR reactors for some years but would none-
theless like to keep informed of developments should
opportunities arise.21 British involvement as noted
above, remained in the areas of training at Harwell
(along with the broader Higher Education Institution
facilities) and in service contracts but in a bid to develop
contacts, Dr Walter Marshall – Chief Scientist at the
Department of Energy – was dispatched in February
1975 as part of a “dialogue” the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office (FCO) was trying to establish on technical
matters in the wider Persian Gulf area. This proved a
shrewd move inasmuch as Marshall was able to establish
“a close rapport with Dr Etemad and has had regular dis-
cussions with him…”.22
What changed throughout 1975 was a growing frus-
tration with the failure of suppliers to deliver and in
many cases, letters of intent were not being converted
into contracts. Etemad had expressed himself unwilling
to work with either the Americans or the Soviet Union
in part because he felt Iran would have little leverage
with either of the superpowers and should they choose
to drag their feet in the implementation of their
17Ibid., 103.
18AB 48/1286, “Visit to Iran from 13th to 19th December 1975.”
19AB 48/1289, Middle East Monitor, 32. The article also outlines some quite extraordinary figures for the cost of the programme with direct and indirect costs
reaching some $120 bn though to 1992. Etemad did not think that these reflected the actual costs, Interview with Author, London, 25 August 2014.
20Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 109.
21According to one report, the SGHWRs would not be ready for export till the mid-1980s, see FCO 96/585, “UK/Iran Nuclear Cooperation at Present and the
Future.”
22Ibid. For further detail on the discussions in 1975 see Hamblin, pp. 29–30.
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contractual obligations – or indeed in actually getting to
a contract in the case of the United States,23 there was
little Iran might be able to do to bring pressure to
bear. Etemad later recounted a chance meeting with a
Brazilian colleague in Paris where the latter lamented
the protracted nature of the work being conducted by
Westinghouse which had been due for last seven years
(the work had begun in 1976) and would now be
lucky if it was completed by 1989!24 Etemad also
regarded the Americans as far too transparent in their
negotiations, since almost everything had to be aired
through Congressional hearings25 and the Americans
were determined to have additional bilateral safeguard
agreements in place before any work could begin. Ete-
mad considered this excessive in light of the NPT,
and for good measure, the French considered the Amer-
ican approach, foolish.26
As for the Soviet Union, a belated attempt to culti-
vate links by inviting Etemad and his team to visit reac-
tor sites in the USSR had ended in farce. The 10-day
visit in July 1977 had, according to Etemad, “been
hell. The team had seen nothing but nuclear installa-
tions, many of which would not satisfy any inter-
national safety requirements…”. Etemad added that
the team had been quite exhausted by the excessive tra-
vel but “had been able to confirm for themselves that
stories of the Russians cornering supplies of the best
Caspian caviar were nonsense. They had been treated
to the most appalling stuff!” Regarding Soviet proposals
for cooperation, Sotoudeh Nia, “told me that the team
had taken particular delight in issuing a firm ‘niet’”.27
The other country that received short shrift from Ete-
mad was Canada whose barely disguised attempt to
bribe Etemad had resulted in the latter walking out of
a meeting and refusing to deal with them.28 The Ger-
mans and the French proved more subtle in their
approach to negotiations though were not beyond offer-
ing “sweeteners” or indeed attempting to circumvent
the process.29 The main problem with the Germans
was their apparent refusal to countenance any form of
technology transfer or to see Iranian components used
in the construction of the reactors.30 They were
determined to supply everything and this contradicted
Etemad’s overall strategy to move away from “turnkey”
contracts.31 Moreover, if the Germans had not insisted
on bilateral safeguards before starting work, they grew
increasingly insistent on securing one as the work
progressed.32
France’s problems were of a different nature. Their
willingness to show flexibility on the nature of the con-
tract extended to their overall approach which sought
at times to circumvent Etemad and the AEOI altogether
and deal directly with the Shah, an approach that
reflected a widespread belief – shared by many including
the British – that all power emanated from the Shah as
did decisions and initiatives. While the Shah might
enjoy the final say and was quite capable of making
spontaneous decisions, at least as far as the nuclear
industry was concerned, the decision-making process
was more “devolved” than in other sectors. On at least
one occasion, Etemad intervened to prevent a French
delegation from meeting the Shah independently of
him, only to inform the Shah afterwards, and to be com-
mended for his timely intervention.33
If Etemad enjoyed the full confidence of the Shah, he
likewise extended his confidence to his own subordi-
nates, most obviously Sotoudeh Nia, whose hard bar-
gaining with the French was duly noted and
commended in British internal reviews.
As we have noticed in other sectors recently, it is often
the technocrats actually involved in the purchase and
construction of equipment who at the end of the day
have the strongest say in how things work out. On this
score Dr Sotoudeh Nia’s track record is impressive. He
incurred the wrath of Mr Najmabadi, the former minis-
ter of Industries and Mines, when he intervened at a
ministerial meeting with M. d’Ornano a year ago (with-
out instructions to do so) to tell the Frenchman that
there would be no deal for French reactors unless
there was substantial movement on price. When Mr
Najmabadi told him that it was the Shah’s wish that
the deal should go through, Dr Sotoudeh Nia said that
the Shah had entrusted AEOI with the purchase of
nuclear reactors on whatever terms they thought best,
and that was how they intended to proceed. According
to Dr Sotoudeh Nia, the Shah supported this line fully
23Ibid.
24Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 125.
25Ibid., 117.
26FCO 96/585, “Westmacott to Wilmshurst.” Dated 24 March 1976.
27FCO 96/738, “Westmacott to Chancery, Moscow.” Etemad later confirmed this account and added for good measure that his luggage had been lost for the entire
trip, Interview with Author, London, 25 August 2014.
28Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 132.
29Etemad, for example, notes that while the French never sought to bribe officials, they did offer him a Legion d’Honneur, which Etemad politely refused. Inter-
view with Author, London, 25 August 2014. On German negotiations and flexibility on costing, see Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,” 132.
30This was not limited obviously to the Iranians. They grew especially anxious at the prospect of an agreement with Britain to provide a safety assessment of
nuclear facilities that would expose their technology to “foreign competitors”, see FCO 96/585, “Note of a meeting with H.E. Dr. Akbar Etemad in London.”
31FCO 96/738, “Letter from Wilmshurst”, dated 16th February 1977.
32FCO 96/585, “Westmacott to Wilmshurst.” Dated 24 March 1976.
33Interview with Author, London, 25 August 2014. See also Patrikarakos, p. 38.
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in subsequent talks with President Giscard, and the net
result was an agreed price 32% lower than Framatome
had been holding out for.34
Despite this insight, the British clung to the view that lit-
tle could be done without the Shah’s prior agreement but
that said, this view was qualiﬁed by an appreciation of
the importance of cultivating links at all levels and in
this respect, Marshall’s good relationship with Etemad
was to be important. In many ways, Etemad and his ofﬁ-
cials had a far more constructive and productive
relationship with the Shah than their British counter-
parts enjoyed with their own ministerial superiors.
Forging an agreement
The radical proposal that would emerge in February
1977 was considerably longer in gestation even if the
details would not be fleshed out until subsequent dis-
cussions were held. But it was quite clear a year earlier
that Iran was becoming frustrated with its Franco-Ger-
man partners to say nothing of the stalled negotiations
with the Americans. The Iranians made increasing
overtures to the British to become involved and in
one meeting between then Foreign Secretary Jim Call-
aghan and Prime Minister Hoveyda in Tehran in
March 1976, the latter said that he had enjoyed an
interesting conversation with the British Secretary of
Energy but felt that the British needed to be “more
aggressive” in pressing their energy prospects.35 The
Secretary of Energy in question, Tony Benn, had in
fact had an audience with the Shah in January of
that year and in light of subsequent developments,
the visit was in all probability arranged in order to
convince Benn, rather than the Shah, of the merits of
possible collaboration.
Indeed, prior to his meeting with the Shah, Benn first
met with Etemad who gave a detailed and frank presen-
tation of Iran’s programme, its ambitions, requirements
and current shortfalls, which lay in manpower and infra-
structure, though Etemad assured Benn that progress
was being made on all fronts. He inquired as to the possi-
bility of further training contracts and also of the likeli-
hood of securing a contract with British Nuclear Fuels
Limited (BNFL) to secure further supplies of enriched
uranium to complement that being acquired through
Eurodif and Coredif in France. The key, argued Etemad,
was to diversify supply. He added for good measure that
Iran was in the process of surveying for its own uranium
deposits, a prospect that engendered considerable
interest in Benn who commented that, “a discovery of
substantial quantities of uranium would be almost as
valuable to Iran as her substantial oil reserves”. Etemad
then proceeded onto the sensitive matter of reprocessing
technology noting that Iran ultimately wanted to seek
“total self-sufficiency” in the nuclear field and that he
was anxious about Iran becoming dependent or open
to economic blackmail by the nuclear suppliers group.
Dr Etemad was also concerned that more and more
restrictions were being placed on the transfer of technol-
ogy – in some cases against normal commercial practice.
Iran was, of course, a firm believer in the NPT and did
not wish any more countries to gain access to nuclear
weapons. But he wanted Iran’s status as a sincere signa-
tory of the Treaty to be recognised.
Benn was gracious but non-committal and noted that
there was no question of any relationship being anything
but equal. He added for good measure that the pursuit of
self-sufﬁciency was unrealistic, “All the industrialised
nations of the West were inter-dependent in the nuclear
business and they had all learned to live with it”. Etemad
responded that it was all well and good for Western
industrialised countries to be dependent on each other,
but quite another thing “for a Middle Eastern oil produ-
cer to be dependent on the West”.36
The meeting ended at 10:15 after which Benn was
taken to his audience with the Shah. Here, it was not
so much the detail that mattered but the general bonho-
mie that ensued and the stated belief that with Britain
about to become an oil exporter, there were many
shared interests and priorities – a view it should be
stressed that was promoted by Benn as much as the
Shah. The Shah characteristically talked of “our civilis-
ation”, drew reference to “Our boys together in
Oman”, and the need to stick together. He added for
good measure that he had noted with satisfaction,
“Prime Minister Wilson’s statement that Iran was
more socialist than the UK”. He then proceeded to out-
line his overall strategy for rapid industrialisation, not-
ing that oil would fund this for the present but that
other streams of revenue needed to be developed and
oil and gas itself needed to be conserved and not wasted
on generating electricity.
As regards Atomic energy the Shah said that his country
had engaged herself in an all out programme in order to
save oil and gas – even if Iran did possess more gas than
the USSR. It was ridiculous, a sin and crime to use oil
and gas for electricity generation when atomic power
or solar energy could be substituted.
34EG 8/332, Iran: International Nuclear Cooperation, “Westmacott, Minute of meeting with Sotoudeh Nia.”
35FCO 96/585, “Record of a Meeting between the Foreign.” In a classic case of politicians getting beyond themselves, Callaghan and Hoveyda agreed to inves-
tigate the possibility of collaboration in nuclear fusion; see in this regard the same file, “Wilmshurst to Alston.”
36FCO 96/585, “Meeting between the Rt. Hon. Mr Anthony Benn.”
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Following a discussion about the consortium and its
failures to lift enough oil, matters soon turned to the
status of Britain’s new oilﬁelds in the North Sea
which the Shah suggested could be the basis of a trans-
formation of Britain’s industrial base, “providing that
people did not simply see North Sea oil as a source
of money and leave it at that”. Benn responded with
a conﬁdence that an ofﬁcial in the FCO clearly did
not share that Britain not only enjoyed a trained
industrial workforce, but there existed “a deep stab-
ility” in British society.
Following some further discussion of nuclear power –
with Benn suggesting that Iran might learn from Brit-
ain’s mistakes and benefit from her expertise – matters
turned to political philosophies, and here perhaps sur-
prisingly, hitherto unseen synergies began to emerge.
Benn said that,
he had been very impressed by what was being
achieved in Iran and commented on the very high
quality of the Ministers and officials he had met. The
Shah said that even more important than this was the
human approach adopted by Iran. Social justice was
the major aim and he intended to remove all possible
signs of exploitation.
Benn, clearly impressed, asked the Shah how he had
formed his vision for the future of Iran and the White
Revolution, and was treated to a summary history of
his reign (including a reference to “a madman who
came to power”, helpfully identiﬁed by the note-taker
as Mosaddeq), after which, “Mr Benn thanked the
Shah for a most interesting accounts of the development
of his philosophy”, adding for good measure that “per-
haps the Shah was being too modest in view of his
own contribution…”.37
Little surprise that Etemad considered Benn’s visit a
great success and in a subsequent conversation with
Marshall, he added
that it was even more significant that the Secretary of
State’s meeting with the Shah had gone well. Etemad
told me that before the Secretary of State arrived for
his audience with His Majesty, the latter had said to
him that he was anxious on principle to build up inter-
action with the UK on nuclear matters so as to counter-
balance the large interaction which Iran has at present
with France and Germany.38
The political ground suitably prepared, Etemad began to
probe the possibilities of collaboration with Marshall,
especially the possibility of investing in a joint enterprise
on “centrifuge enrichment”. This was important because
current supplies of enriched uranium were guaranteed
only until 1988. Etemad expressed anxiety, however,
about the growing restrictions being imposed by the
“club of London”, and he noted that discussions with
the United States had collapsed completely because he
had come to the conclusion that they wished to impose
arrangements that would actually “penalise signatories
to the NPT”. Responding to Marshall’s request for
more clarity, Etemad stated,
If he invests in a joint centrifuge enterprise he wishes to
reserve an option – if this makes economical good sense
– eventually to build a plant in Iran, jointly with his UK
partners. he emphasised that any such plan would be
fully covered by IAEA safeguards and he also that
there was no policy decision by the government that
they wanted to build such a plant but there was a policy
decision that they would not enter into any agreement
which forbad them to build such a plant.
Etemad, clearly keen to test the mood, added that he
would also like to explore the possibility of joint enter-
prise to reprocess Iranian nuclear fuel in the UK, retain-
ing the option, as Japan had done, to build a reprocessing
plant in Iran at some time in the future, “subject to IAEA
safeguards”. When Marshall noted that he would trans-
mit these views to the relevant people back in the UK and
encouraged Etemad to take these matters up in direct
negotiations, Etemad responded that, “he would prefer
not to do so at the present time but asked me instead
to investigate these ideas along the lines outlined and
then make proposals to him” (italics added).39
The two men next met in London on 9 February fol-
lowing Marshall’s discussion with colleagues in the UK
government. It was clear to both that any agreement
faced significant political obstacles, both domestic and
international and that these would need to be addressed.
Marshall assured Etemad, much to the latter’s satisfac-
tion, that his understanding of the Club of London was
that its primary function was to facilitate and enforce
“to all practical extent the NPT Agreements and IAEA
safeguards”. Drawing attention to a proposed French
contract for reprocessing plant in South Korea that had
fallen through, Etemad raised concerns that this might
have resulted from American pressure no doubt due to
the inherent instability of South Korea, adding for
good measure that he hoped that such tactics would
37FCO 96/585, “Note of the Secretary of State for Energy’s Audience,” 1–8. This note ends with the following remarkable statement about the Shah’s plans for his
succession: “… the Shah said that he planned to hand over to the Crown Prince in thirteen years time. After the conclusion of the current 5-year Plan, he hoped
to see through another two and plan a third”. There is no other record of the Shah having been so specific with regard to the timetable for succession and
Etemad has no recollection of this having been said.
38FCO 96/585, “Note for the record on a discussion with Dr Etemad,” 1.
39Ibid, 3–4.
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not be applied to “stable” countries like Iran. Further-
more, “he was clear that, because Iran had signed the
NPT, there was no bar to the UK supplying a reproces-
sing or enrichment plant to Iran at some time in the
future”.40 This last statement and the contention that
Iran was “stable” were both highlighted by one diplo-
matic reader of this note, reflecting the different percep-
tion of Iran’s position, to say nothing of the
interpretation of the NPT, but also perhaps the impend-
ing disagreements that would surface between Britain’s
nuclear and foreign policy establishments towards the
possibilities of such a strategic engagement with Iran.
In Walter Marshall, however, Etemad clearly had a
sympathetic ear, even if Marshall was at pains to empha-
sise the various safeguard agreements that would have to
be implemented should Iran decide that it wanted a
reprocessing or enrichment plant of its own. Among
these safeguards were the physical protection of any
site; an assurance that Iran would not re-export technol-
ogy to a third country without the prior agreement, and
an assurance that should an enrichment plant be built,
Iran would agree to a cap of 20% enrichment unless
otherwise agreed with the UK. Most grating for Etemad
was the insistence that Iran provide further assurance
that the technology would not be used to produce an
explosive device through the implementation of a bilat-
eral agreement which would likewise cover any further
plants built in Iran. Etemad felt that in light of the
NPT, this was surplus to requirements, and enquired if
the safeguards would still apply if Iran were at some
later stage to withdraw from the NPT. Marshall con-
firmed that such obligations would remain under the
terms of the bilateral agreement. Etemad turned the dis-
cussion towards the commercial restrictions this would
apparently place on Iran on the basis that Iran might
in due course develop nuclear technologies of its own.
Marshall “agreed that a suitable form of words would
have to be agreed since it was not the intent of the UK
that Iran should suffer commercial disadvantages from
a Government to Government agreement addressed to
‘political’ matters”. There followed some brief discussion
on the merits of regional fuel cycle centres being pro-
moted by the United States, but which both parties
agreed were impractical and a British admission that
given its nuclear agreements with the Germans, French
and the Dutch, some level of consultation with her Euro-
pean partners would be required. In sum, Marshall con-
ceded that Britain would not at present be able to
facilitate any agreement with Iran entirely on its own.
Matters then turned to the crux of the discussion as
Etemad sought to probe further into the possibilities of
an equity participation in which the Iranians would
first buy a share in a UK plant, send technicians and
engineers, followed by a third phase when the UK
would take an equity share in an Iranian enrichment
plant based on centrifuge rather than diffusion tech-
nology. At all stages, Etemad was keen to stress the
necessity not to sign any agreements that might put
Iran at a technological disadvantage at any time in
the future. So, for example, the Iranians were not at
all sure they wanted a reprocessing plant at the
moment, “but they were sure that they did not want
to come to any agreement which forbad it in the future”
(emphasis in the original). The discussion ended on the
basis that Marshall would go away and prepare a pro-
posal that would facilitate Iran’s plans to install reac-
tors at an average rate of 1500 MW per year through
the 1980s.
The agreement
Despite this encouragement from Etemad, the British
were slow to move on his suggestions. Part of this no
doubt reflected the natural procrastination of bureauc-
racies and as Hoveida’s comments (noted above) in
March 1976 indicated, the Iranians were finding British
inaction increasingly frustrating if not a little bewilder-
ing. For all the progress being made on the agreements
with the French and the Germans, both these partners
had their own problems for the Iranians and indeed
for the all the French enthusiasm, Etemad noted an
anxiety that they would ultimately drive a much harder
bargain on account of their not having yet signed the
NPT. The British reluctance to get engaged in the Iranian
nuclear programme, however, also probably reflected the
weaknesses of their own industrial strategy which had
made them increasingly dependent on the European
partners and the fact that internal disagreements per-
sisted as to the merits of such an extensive and strategic
economic partnership, pregnant as it was with political
consequences.41 Nonetheless, by February 1977, Etemad
decided to raise the stakes and rather than wait for a pro-
posal from the British, decided to anticipate it with one
of his own.42 Despite Marshall’s belief that such a propo-
sal would have been “inconceivable” without the prior
agreement of the Shah, Etemad suggests otherwise.
According to Etemad, the precise parameters of the pro-
posal were basically developed by himself, partly it would
40FCO 96/585, “Note of a meeting with H.E. Dr. Akbar Etemad in London.”
41FCO 96/585, “Wilmshurst to Alston.”
42Quoted above, p. 1
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seem to draw the British in – after their frustrating reluc-
tance to take the bait over the previous year – and only if
it elicited a favourable response would the Shah have
been informed. As Marshall himself noted in his per-
sonal thoughts on the meeting,
The proposal offers the entire market and he still plans
23,000 MW at about 2000 MW a year, very roughly
$2,000 m a year. He is well aware of the advantages to
balance of payments and jobs in the UK. He means to
be tempting us.43
Marshall was clearly struck by the Iranian frustration
with both the French and the Germans, who had report-
edly been far too greedy in Iranian eyes, and he noted
with some satisfaction “that the main asset the UK has
is honesty”, though this statement did implicitly reﬂect
the reality that the British nuclear industry as it stood
was not capable of fulﬁlling the opportunity that had
presented itself.
Wilmshurst noted that the deal was predicated on
Britain choosing PWR and even if ministers went
down this route, “we would have to buy the technology
from abroad, either from the United States, France, or
the Federal Republic of Germany”, all of which were
likely to look askew at selling Britain the means to dom-
inate the Iranian market.44 Officials noted in the margins
that there were “formidable” arguments against involve-
ment but that the proposal (since in their view it must
have had the approval of the Shah) needed to be taken
seriously. With customary clarity, the British Ambassa-
dor, Sir Antony Parsons, noted that Etemad was propos-
ing nothing less than, “an arrangement whereby Iran
would participate financially in the reorganisation of
the British nuclear industry”. He added that the potential
(mutual) gains were enormous. AEOI were clearly disen-
chanted with the “turnkey principle” which they had
pursued in part because of the short timetable presented
to them by the Shah. But now they appeared to have
more time by which they could develop the industry in
a joint venture, “perhaps using an Anglo-Iranian com-
pany”, that would ultimately yield profits to Iran as
well as a measure of technology transfer.45 The issue of
technology transfer was one that rankled with British
officials, not least because of the need to manage expec-
tations but also because of the anticipated reaction of the
Americans. Marshall was more sanguine,
Eventually, but in my view not for another ten years at
least Etemad will ask for reprocessing and enrichment
technology. Given the state of Iranian industry we
ought to be able to put him off until near the end of
the century.46
Such assurances would not convince everyone. Even
before Etemad’s proposal had been made, anxieties
about the consequences of any cooperation were being
voiced in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) where one offi-
cial asked to comment on the possibilities of cooperation
outlined in a paper, noted in the opening paragraph,
I cannot help but conclude that the paper is drafted so as
to hide the fact that Ministers are being invited to put
commercial interests ahead of non-proliferation con-
siderations when it comes to the possibility of providing
re-processing and/or enrichment technology.47
Westmacott’s assessment of the proliferation risk was
more nuanced.
Access to technology for either enrichment or reproces-
sing would give Iran a potential capability to develop
nuclear weapons. Iran is party to the NPT and we
have no reason to suppose that she intends to develop
nuclear weapons, but a future change of policy cannot
be ruled out. Iran has no economic need for either an
indigenous enrichment or reprocessing plant at present,
but could have when her nuclear programme is much
further developed. Moreover the importance which the
Iranians attach to being able to acquire this technology
in the longer term might be sufficient stimulus to initiate
domestic R and D, if potential suppliers were completely
to close the door now on eventual technology transfer.
Unless such a response by the Iranians can be dis-
counted, the interest of non-proliferation would therefore
be better served by not completely ruling out the possi-
bility of eventual transfer of enrichment and/or reproces-
sing technology. (Italics added)48
These reservations aside,Marshall led a team including
Ned Franklin back to Iran in the following July, where
according to Parsons, “From the start it was clear that
the Iranians meant business”. At the opening session on
23 July, much to Parson’s surprise, Etemad was
accompanied by one Cyrus Ansari, the brother of the
Minister of Economics and Finance, Hushang Ansari.
Ansari’s presence was of considerable significance. Not
only does it mean that his brother – a very powerful
man – is in on the act, but also as Cyrus is only used
by the Shah for major politico-economic negotiations
43FCO 96 738, “Note for the Record of Discussions in Iran.” Visiting London also was noted as an attraction for Etemad’s staff. Note that the figure of 23,000 MW
differs from that recorded in AB 48/1286 cited above.
44FCO 96 738, “Note from Wilmshurst.”
45FCO 96 738, “Parsons to Burroughs.”
46FCO 96 738, “Note for the Record of Discussions in Iran.”
47EG 8/332, “Letter from MOD to Department of Energy.”
48EG 8/332, “Westmacott to Wilmshurst.” Dated 21 February 1977.
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where the Iranians either mean real business or want to
give the impression that they do.
This last caveat was revealing, inasmuch as the shear
energy of the Iranian side far from engendering conﬁ-
dence, had quite the opposite effect on Parsons who
wondered aloud whether this was all a bit of theatre
intended to galvanise Britain’s competitors.
… [W]e are still not quite sure what the Iranians are up
to. Normally negotiations in Iran are very difficult and
very slow. Yet here we are with a top level Iranian
team making much of the running in the conclusion
of a provisional agreement covering an extremely ambi-
tious and complex scheme of cooperation without once
appearing to have stopped to consider such basic ques-
tions as, for example, the competence of British industry
to fulfil the function asked for it.49
The meetings which went over “three days of hard
negotiations – in some cases up to 15 hours non-stop”,
resulted in a detailed (eight-page) memorandum which
outlined mutual expectations. This envisaged the estab-
lishment of a joint company to develop the nuclear
industries in both Britain and Iran and was clearly pre-
dicated on the development of PWRs. The first such
reactors would not be built in Britain till 1980 at the ear-
liest with construction in Iran from 1982/1983. Although
it stressed the civil nature of the programme to be devel-
oped, it was clear from the memorandum that the acqui-
sition of technology and skills training were vital
components of any agreement. Similarly, although due
consideration would be made of the respective industrial
bases in each country, it was anticipated that com-
ponents would be made in Iran as well as Britain. More-
over, the memorandum stipulated that, “It is intended
that the Company should develop so as to provide full
and equal access to technology to the Iranian and UK
partners within the Company”.50 The company would
be the only supplier of PWRs to the UK with matching
responsibilities in Iran. Where the number of reactors
in Iran exceeded the number planned for the UK,
while the company would effectively enjoy first refusal
on all orders but that this should not detract from the
ability of AEOI to place orders with other suppliers if
need be. The ownership of the company would be on a
50:50 basis.
Further details would be provided in the “Outline
Plan for the Formation and Operations of the Nuclear
Company of Britain and Iran (NCBI)”, the second
draft of which was completed by 8 September.51
This specified the objectives of the company, to
“design, market, manufacture, construct and commis-
sion PWR power stations […] and related supplies
and services in Iran, the UK and third countries”,
and “to establish the appropriate technological and
manufacturing bases in Iran and the UK, acquiring
both Iranian and UK staff for that purposes within
general principle of symmetry and equality of access
to information”. The company would be the only sup-
pliers of PWRs in the UK and would supply the equiv-
alent to Iran with any over the UK number being
ordered from the company on a preferential, if not
exclusive, basis. The initial two orders would begin
in the UK in 1980, to be followed by Iran in 1982/
1983. Following the construction of the initial two
power stations in each country, there would be at
least one additional power station commissioned
every subsequent year. Given the lack of parity
between the industrial bases in each country, work
would be begin in the UK and gradually transfer to
Iran as technological and industrial parity was
achieved. Employment in the company and its sub-
sidiary bodies in Iran and the UK would be open to
nationals of both countries. Care would be taken to
address the technical and cultural differences,
Certain nominated appointment based on nationality
can help promote good relations and these are made
to ensure that the problems and backgrounds of
nationals transferred to the other country are properly
understood and that differences between national atti-
tudes and practices do not become sources of friction.
The 19-page plan went into considerable detail as to
the practicalities of the collaboration though even here
in some cases the implications were implicit rather
than explicit, and questions remained over how the
work would be shared in the initial stages and indeed
whether the British government would choose PWR
power stations – a decision on which, as far as the Ira-
nians were concerned, the entire agreement depended.
But the mood was one of optimism and at one level, at
least the political will seemed to exist. In a follow-up
visit to Tehran at the end of September, Lord Aldington
stressed, to Etemad and Prime Minister Amouzegar’s
agreement that, “… the important aspect of the co-oper-
ation was on the ground. The project would only work if
we in Britain treated the Iranians involved as British and
if the Iranians treated the British involved as Iranians”.
This was a remarkable statement of intent, and Parson’s
49AB48/1531 UKAEA, “Nuclear collaboration with Iran.” In an earlier meeting on 24 July at the AEOI offices in Tehran, Marshall explained that there remained a
“credibility gap” in Britain over the likelihood of the collaboration, “Notes of a Meeting at the Offices of the AEOI.” Tehran, 24 July 1977, Dated 1 August 1977.
50FCO 96/738, “Cooperation between UK and Iran on Nuclear Power Matters.” Memorandum, Dated 25 July 1977, article 4.1.3
51AB48/1531 UKAEA, “Outline Plan.”
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noted to his satisfaction that his earlier doubts were dis-
sipating.52 The Shah was likewise in buoyant mood.
According to Parsons,
The Shah was fully briefed. He was enthusiastic about
the prospect of cooperating with us, saying that it
seemed particularly appropriate in that his oil and our
North Sea Oil would probably run out at roughly the
same time i.e. sometime in the 1990s.53
Fallout
The seriousness of the proposal was underlined by the
changing nature of the discussion in Whitehall. Though
British officials stressed that nothing had been com-
mitted as yet, the momentum was swinging towards
the launch of an extraordinary economic and political
pact which would have bound Iran and Britain for
least a generation. Indeed, it was remarkable that within
25 years of the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, both countries were contemplating engaging
in a far more intimate – if undoubtedly more balanced
joint venture, which in the words of Aldington, would
have in practice resulted in British and Iranian nationals
being treated as nationals of the other country. There
were questions of capacity and capability on both sides,
and of course, the agreement remained dependent on a
British decision to choose PWR power stations. Simi-
larly, there was considerable anxiety about the potential
for dual use technology transfer though Aldington
among others felt that this would be better contained
through engagement rather than a blanket ban, which
would likely provoke and encourage the Iranians to
move ahead on research and development. Britain’s
advantage – ironically given the popular historical view
– was not only that it was deemed an honest partner,
but also that it took the Iranians seriously. “What Iran
wanted was for the UK to treat her seriously as a full
partner. The Iranians did not believe that the French
or the Germans, for instance, would ever do this”.54
Given the strategic nature of the proposed collabor-
ation, matters now moved to questions of political stab-
ility and public opinion in the UK, especially with regard
to the human rights situation in Iran. It was acknowl-
edged that Iran received particularly bad coverage of its
human rights record in the Western press, but the
sober assessment of the FCO was that the Shah was
not the worst offender, and perhaps more intriguingly,
“that it was possible that it [human rights] might have
now passed its peak as an important issue”. This was
probably optimistic given the Shah’s own apparent lack
of awareness about public opinion in the West. In an
interview for the Chicago Tribune, the Shah “reaffirmed”
that there were only 2200 political prisoners in Iran, an
aside that elicited astonishment from the FCO reader.55
In a subsequent meeting with the Secretary State for
Energy, Tony Benn, Lord Aldington outlined the mutual
benefits for the British economy and the interest Iranians
had in acquiring expertise. Aldington noted that the idea
of a 50/50 partnership harboured some difficulties not
least because from the British perspective, the weight of
expertise being contributed would, initially at least, be
far in excess of anything the Iranians could contribute,
so some consideration might be given to lowering Brit-
ain’s initial financial outlay. At the same time, Britain
could expect to earn between £100 and £180 m per
year in orders for plant and equipment, from 1985
onwards rising to £230 m per annum by the end of the
century.56 Questions remained over the wisdom of tech-
nology transfer, and the Iranian attitude to human rights;
questions that were raised in more detail in a follow-up
paper requested by Benn. In the cover letter to the
paper, Aldington made clear that much hinged on Brit-
ain selecting PWRs for its own nuclear programme,
though he added in the paper that the Iranian govern-
ment would be flexible enough for Britain to select a
mix of reactors as long as PWRs were among that mix.
Aside from the positive impact that was likely to emerge
for broader industrial relations and trade with Iran,
Aldington noted the benefits to Britain’s balance of pay-
ments and concluded in the section on advantages to
Britain that,
We estimate that orders for nuclear power stations by
Iran at the rate of one power station per annum would
provide employment for several tens of thousands of
people in Britain when account is taken of all the
work involved.
Moving onto the “questions and difficulties”, Alding-
ton posited the issue of Iran’s economic strength and
purchasing power given the assessment that oil revenue
would dwindle by the 1990s and also questioned the
inherent stability of the Shah’s government and whether
there was a possibility of anarchy following the Shah (a
likelihood that Aldington considered slight). More to
the point, “The question must also be asked whether
Iran is considered politically, as a suitable partner for
Britain in the nuclear power industry”. Presently,
52AB48/1531 UKAEA, “Parson Note on the Visit of Lord Aldington.”
53FCO 96/738, “Parsons Note on Meeting with the Shah on 13th October.”
54Ibid. “Record of a Meeting Held with Lord Aldington.”
55Ibid. “Iranian Policy.” The astonishment was probably caused by the Shah’s blasé admission more than the fact itself which cannot have been a surprise.
56EG 8/332, “Note of a Meeting Held in the Office of the Secretary.”
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concluded Aldington, answering his own question, he
foresaw few problems, especially since Iran was a signa-
tory to the NPT and the “Shah’s government does appear
to respond to western opinion in a reasonable way”.
More problematic for Aldington was the question of
management and he reiterated his point that,
The management team has to be one, and not two,
despite the inclusion in it of people from different
countries. The Iranians will be treated as if they were
British and vice versa, and there have to be no prefer-
ence given to any one nationality any more than dis-
crimination against any one. Great care will have to be
taken in establishing the principles or organisation
and getting Iranian agreement to them.
Such practical problems as these were, however, not
insurmountable and Aldington concluded the paper by
voicing his concern that the real danger to the contract
lay in British prevarication over the selection of reactor
type.57
Denouement
No sooner had these discussions taken place than the
first chinks in the potential agreement appeared with
the sudden announcement that Iran had signed further
agreements with the Germans and were closely investi-
gating the possibility of further reactor purchases from
the French and negotiating for a further eight reactors
from the United States. Noting that this would total 20
new reactors, Westmacott was swiftly dispatched to see
Sotoudeh Nia.
I suggested to Dr Sotoudeh-Nia that, if accurate, this
picture did not leave much of a role for the proposed
Irano-British joint venture. He told me that, on the
record, he should say there was still room for everyone
in Iran’s nuclear power programme. “Off the record”,
he said, “I can tell you that if you don’t hurry up there
will be nothing left for Britain”.
It was clear from Sotoudeh Nia’s comments that the joint
venture discussed for the better part of the year appeared
to have slipped down the list of priorities.
I told Dr Sotoudeh-Nia that I had understood it to be
important to Iran to become progressively involved in
the design, manufacture and construction of nuclear
power plants and that if at all possible there were to
be no more turnkey contracts. What he had told me
suggested that this was not necessarily the case now.
Dr Sotoudeh-Nia sighed. He explained how he had
forced Kraftwerk Union to use Iranian manufacturers
for low technology components at Bushehr. The only
result had been delays and unnecessary expense because
in all cases the Iranian components had not been good
enough. In his view, a choice had to be made; either
one wanted power stations on time that worked, or
one wanted them late with the possibility of technical
defects as well. As far as he was concerned, it had
been made clear to him that the nuclear energy pro-
gramme was of the highest priority; against his own
instincts, he had therefore had to give up trying to
force Iranian participation on his foreign suppliers,
and he would continue to award contracts to produce
working power stations on time.58
Sotoudeh Nia had effectively revealed that the “grand
design” was off, largely it would seem because of the
Shah’s urgency to get things done. Having moved
away, quite sensibly as far as long-term industrial strat-
egy was concerned, from turnkey contracts that would
see no meaningful technology transfer to Iran, the reality
of domestic manufacturing limitations and imperial
impatience had resulted in two years of planning and
discussion being shelved. Etemad was more reluctant
to give up on the idea than his deputy and suggested
to Parsons that the possibility of a deal still existed but
that Iran “could not afford to wait forever”.59 By Febru-
ary, however, any outside opportunity was firmly closed
by the British decision not to pursue PWRs. Although
Aldington held out hope that given both sides had
shifted, there might still be room for a more modest con-
tract, it was left to Marshall to confirm what was by then
an open secret. Meeting with Etemad in Tehran in
March 1978, the latter stated that in light of recent
decisions he considered,
himself released from the moral obligation to keep open
that opportunity until the UK had made its policy
decisions… I replied that I was unable to disagree
with him on this matter and that I thought Lord Alding-
ton would understand why a major opportunity should
now be regarded as closed.60
By then, of course, though it seems no one had
noticed, the starting gun for the Islamic Revolution
had been fired. In the next few months, the Pahlavi mon-
archy would begin to unravel at a speed and intensity
that few had anticipated. The very “anarchy” that
Aldington had feared, but most had dismissed as a realis-
tic possibility now increasingly looked like a probability
and Iran’s ambitious nuclear policy was firmly in the
sights of Iran’s new coalition of revolutionaries who dis-
missed the programme as a waste of money that should
instead be spent on exploiting Iran’s vast natural gas
reserves. Etemad was in effect disowned by the Shah
57EG 8/332, “Note for the Secretary of State for Energy.”
58EG 8/332, “Westmacott, Minute of Meeting with Sotoudeh Nia.” It would be a further week before the news was digested in London.
59FCO 8/3207, “Parsons Minute of Meeting with Etemad.”
60AB 48/1291, “Meeting with Dr. Etemad on Saturday 11 March 1978.”
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and was widely attacked by critics of the regime despite
his reputation “as an honest and incorruptible civil ser-
vant”.61 At least he was able to escape the worst excesses
of the revolution. Sotoudeh Nia was arrested and incar-
cerated for four years. Despite these vigorous objections,
the Revolutionary Government quietly reviewed and
restarted the programme in 1984.
Conclusion
From a distance, it would be easy to dismiss the idea and
the negotiations that followed as an episode of little sig-
nificance and in fact, it barely registers a mention in most
of the accounts of Iran’s nuclear programme. Yet, the
detail provided by the documents gives the historian
an insight into the way industrial policy and negotiations
were pursued not only in relation to Iran and the Shah’s
role –more strategic than tactical but even here open to a
degree of persuasion not normally admitted to – but also
equally of the UK, where differences in approach become
apparent between the Foreign Office, the various officials
at the UK Atomic Energy Agency, the MOD and last but
by no means least, the politicians. Although the AEOI
may have operated on somewhat different parameters
from other agencies, it is remarkable to what extent Ete-
mad and his officials, most obviously in this case Sotou-
deh Nia, were able to shape the debate. By comparing
and contrasting the Persian and British sources and
their perceptions of each other, one is able to better
ascertain the modus operandi of the AEOI, and the lati-
tude enjoyed by officials is attested to in the British docu-
ments even if some of the conclusions ultimately drawn
(most obviously about the centrality of the Shah to all
decision-making) were somewhat wide of the mark.
But what is also intriguing from the accounts is the
way in which British officials agonised over the reality
or otherwise of the deal on offer, and how Britain’s pos-
ition differed from those of her competitors.
Ultimately, that a deal could be broached and was
taken seriously had much to do with the development
of personal relationships, in this case between Etemad
and Marshall. In not seeking to constantly circumvent
Etemad, Marshall was able to build a relationship of
trust which ultimately gave the British a position of
leverage their competitors could only dream of. As it
was pointedly noted in the summary of his February
1977 meeting, one of Britain’s key assets was trust, a rea-
lity that must have compensated for the many
deficiencies in industrial capacity. But it is worth perhaps
pausing on this thought for a moment and to see this in
the light of established narratives of British–Iranian
relations. Etemad saw merits in an arrangement with
the British because paradoxically their industrial position
was weaker than that of their competitors and their pol-
itical capacity was by extension diminished. It meant that
Iran could participate as close to as an equal as it was
possible to be given the state of Iran’s own industrial
capacity: a capacity that given the Shah’s urgency
would play a major role in shelving the planned
cooperation. But there was a clear logic to what Etemad
had in mind with a view to building an industrial
capacity at a pace that was sustainable for Iran. But the
pace proved too slow for what might be termed the
industrial fetishism of late Pahlavi Iran – a fetishism
one might add that has been hard to dislodge – and
the methodical if slow pace of development was some-
what reluctantly replaced by a return to the much less
satisfactory “turnkey” contracts.
Yet, perhaps what is most remarkable about this
entire agreement was the scale of the vision and the part-
ner of choice. The partnership being explored would
have put the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the shade.
That it was being discussed at all a mere 25 years after
the turbulent nationalisation of AIOC reflects the reality
that the narrative of distrust which has become such a
feature of the historical landscape was never as emphatic
or transparent as its proponents would have us believe.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Dr Etemad for reading through an earlier draft
of this paper and offering his insights, thoughts and com-
ments. The arguments outlined and any remaining errors are
mine alone. I would like to thank the National Archives for
permission to use and quote from the documents referred to
in the article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Bibliography
AB – UK Atomic Energy Authority
EG – Department of Energy
FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office
PREM – Prime Minister’s Office Records
BBC SWB – BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
AB 48/1286, Nuclear Collaboration with Iran, “Visit to Iran
from 13th to 19th December 1975.” Briefing Document
Dated 11 December 1975.
AB 48/1289, Nuclear Collaboration with Iran, Middle East
Monitor, March 1977.
61AB 48/1293, “Electrical Review International.”
IRAN 13
AB 48/1291, Nuclear Collaboration with Iran, “Meeting with
Dr. Etemad on Saturday 11 March 1978.” Dated 15
March 1978.
AB 48/1293, Nuclear Collaboration with Iran, “Electrical
Review International Vol. 203, No. 13, 6th October 1978.”
AB 48/1531, Nuclear Exports to Iran, “Letter from Sir Antony
Parsons to Edward Burrows.” Dated 27 July 1977.
AB48/1531 UKAEA, “Nuclear Collaboration with Iran.”
Parsons to Burrows, dated 27 July 1977.
AB48/1531 UKAEA, “Outline Plan.” Dated 8 September
1977.
AB48/1531 UKAEA, “Parson Note on the Visit of Lord
Aldington.” Dated 26 September 1977.
Akbar Etemad, “Interview for Program of Oral History,
Foundation for Iranian Studies.” Conducted by Farrokh
Ghaffari, Paris, November 1982. Transcript available online
at http://fis-iran.org/en/oralhistory.
BBC SWB ME/4485/D/1, “Shah’s Press Conference.” 23
December 1973, Dated 28 December 1973.
D Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: the birth of a nuclear State,
(London, I B Tauris) 2012.
EG 8/332: Iran: International Nuclear Cooperation, “Letter
from MOD to Department of Energy,” 19 January 1977.
EG 8/332, “Westmacott to Wilmshurst.” Dated 21 February
1977.
EG 8/332, Iran: International Nuclear Cooperation, “Note of a
Meeting Held in the Office of the Secretary of State for
Energy.” Room 1237 Thames House South, Millbank
SW1, at 2 pm on Tuesday, 1 November 1977, to Discuss
the Iranian Proposals on PWR’s, dated 4 November 1977.
EG 8/332, “Note for the Secretary of State for Energy from
Lord Aldington.” Dated 8 November.
EG 8/332, Iran: International Nuclear Cooperation,
“Westmacott, Minute of Meeting with Sotoudeh Nia.” 15
November 1977.
FCO 8/3207, Nuclear Energy in Iran, “Parsons Minute of
Meeting with Etemad.” Dated 9 January 1978.
FCO 96/585, “Note of the Secretary of State for Energy’s
Audience with HIM the Shah at Niavaran Palace.”
Wednesday 7 January 1976 – 11:30 am, Dated 9 January.
FCO 96/585, “Meeting Between the Rt. Hon. Mr Anthony
Benn, Secretary of State for Energy and HE Dr Akbar
Etemad.” 9 am Wednesday 7 January, Note Dated 19
January 1976.
FCO 96/585, “Note for the Record on a Discussion with Dr
Etemad.”Heldon the 26 January 1976,Dated 28 January 1976.
FCO 96/585, “Note of a Meeting with H.E. Dr. Akbar Etemad
in London.” On 9 February 1976, Dated 21 February 1976.
FCO 96/585, “Record of a Meeting Between the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary and the Prime Minister of
Iran.” Dated 7 March 1976.
FCO 96/585, UK/Iran Nuclear Cooperation, “Westmacott to
Wilmshurst.” Dated 24 March 1976.
FCO 96/585, UK/Iran Nuclear Cooperation, “UK/Iran Nuclear
Cooperation at Present and the Future: A factual
Summary.” Dated 29 March 1976.
FCO 96/585, “Wilmshurst to Alston.” Dated 1 April 1976.
FCO 96 738, “Parsons to Burroughs.” 8 February 1977.
FCO 96 738, Cooperation Between UK and Iran on Nuclear
Power Matters, 1977, “Note for the Record: Discussions
with the President of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
Iran in Tehran.” 5–6 February 1977.
FCO 96/738, “Letter from Wilmshurst.” Dated 16 February
1977.
FCO 96 738, W Marshall, “Note for the Record of Discussions
in Iran.” 5–6 February, 1977, Dated 8 February 1977.
FCO96 738, “Note fromWilmshurst.”Dated 16 February 1977.
FCO 96/738, Cooperation Between UK and Iran on Nuclear
Power Matters, “Westmacott to Chancery, Moscow.”
Dated 25 July 1977.
FCO 96/738, Cooperation Between UK and Iran on Nuclear
Power Matters, “Parsons Note on Meeting with the Shah
on 13th October.” Dated 16 October 1977.
FCO 96/738, “Iranian Policy.” Dated 15 November 1977.
FCO 96/738, “Record of a Meeting Held with Lord Aldington
(Chairman, National Nuclear Corporation) On 17th
October in the Foreign Commonwealth Office.” Dated 27
October 1977.
Hamblin, J. D. “The Nuclearization of Iran in the Seventies.”
Diplomatic History 38, no. 5 (2013): 1114–1135.
PREM 15/1684, “Meeting, Shah–Rothschild.” Dated 2
December 1972.
PREM 16/1418, Nuclear Cooperation, “Letter from Weinstock
to Prime Minister Callaghan.” Dated 19 May 1977.
14 A. M. ANSARI
